This article offers a critique of the concept of 'abandonment' when utilized in relation to separated human biomaterials. In the absence of the recognition of even limited property rights in the human source of such materials, the author contends that utilizing abandonment is meaningless and misleading. Absurd consequences need not result from recognition of such rights and indeed most cases of purported abandonment of human tissue are more akin to voluntary transfers. Describing such transfers in terms of abandonment obscures questions as to the agency and the scope of the fiduciary duties of medical professionals and researchers. Income rights in such materials are more appropriately determined as normative questions as to who should benefit from windfall wealth in human biomaterials, not by reference to abandonment. An alternative framework that recognized that the source of human tissue had limited property rights in it would solve many of the conceptual difficulties outlined.
Introduction
Modern advances in biotechnology have led to rigorous debate as to how we properly regulate biological materials once they have been separated from the person. 1 There are conflicting views as the usefulness of utilizing a property model to deal with these issues. 2 Questions as to the ownership of such separated materials, and in particular whether they vests in its source or a subsequent appropriator, such as a medical research institute, have led to some notable litigation. 3 Broadly, these disputes can be divided into those where the power to control the materials is in issue and those where it is the entitlement to the income from their commercialization. 4 To admit that the source has property rights in their tissue after it has been separated from their body, it is feared by some, would impose onerous costs upon medical researchers in investigating title, and would impede research. 5 To prevent this, so this argument goes, the source should be granted no property in their own biological materials. 6 Nonetheless, and somewhat incongruously, a concept derived from property law, that of 'abandonment' has been invoked in this debate in aid of this view. 7 Abandonment first appears prominently in a report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in 1995 concerning legal and ethical issues relating to human tissue. The report recommended, inter alia, that in any consent to treatment, tissue removed in the course of that treatment would be regarded as abandoned by its source. 8 Such an approach would conveniently preclude the source of tissue from making any subsequent claims to it, protecting the hospital and subsequent researchers from having to fend off litigation that might impede the smooth running of the hospital and the progress of important medical research. 9 In other words, it is a simple and easy way to resolve any potential title disputes relating to human tissue. The normative merits of this approach are not the focus of this article. 10 Instead, I seek to critique utilizing the concept of abandonment to justify such an approach. There are a number of elements to this.
First, abandonment is one of those phrases that has different meanings depending on the context. When one describes a person 'abandoning' their property (or their tissue, blood or sperm sample for that matter), it is not always clear what is meant.
11 It can mean, inter alia, the abandonment of all claims in respect of a thing, as appeared to be what was meant in the Nuffield report or be employed as a legal term of art to refer to 'divesting abandonment' a concept derived from property law, whereby an owner loses all ownership of his property if divesting abandonment is found to have occurred. 12 Second, in property law there are specific requirements that must be met before divesting abandonment operates and an owner is deemed to have his ownership extinguished: There must be loss of de facto physical control, there must be an intention to abandon all rights in the property and there must be indifference as to who any subsequent owner might be. 13 I contend that these requirements are often overlooked when discussing abandonment of human tissue, and, further, that if we are to examine these elements closely, it becomes apparent that many cases of purported abandonment of human tissue are more akin to voluntary transfer (also referred to as delivery). Incorrectly invoking abandonment obscures this, and also obscures the potential remedies available to a source of human tissue consequent on such a finding.
Third, I contend that is impossible to determine the role that the concept of abandonment might usefully play in relation to human tissue, when it is has not been conclusively determined where the original ownership of such material lies. I argue that this uncertainty may only be resolved by recognizing that limited property rights vest in the source of the material. Following on from this argument, I contend that the source of human tissue never has income rights to them, and thus such rights accrue as windfall wealth, not by virtue of their abandonment by their source, the concept here further confusing an already muddled area of law. 8 . Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue, at para 9.8. 9. The concern to prevent litigation from the source of human tissue that would impede research was of paramount concern in the Moore case: , at para 4a. This article first sets out the differing meanings of the term abandonment and then examines the law relating to the property law concept of divesting abandonment, fleshing out is operation and requirements. Then, I examine how abandonment has been applied in relation to human tissue, critiquing such use in the Nuffield report and I outline the inappropriateness of using a line of American Jurisprudence as precedent for a general presumption of abandonment. I then set out the difficulty of utilizing abandonment in relation to human tissue, given the uncertainty as to who the original owner of such material is. I further contend that most cases of purported abandonment of hospital waste are more akin to voluntary transfers, as there is no break in seisin and no 'roll of the dice' by their source as to who the subsequent owner might be. I then discuss how income rights in human materials do not arise by virtue of their abandonment by the source, and that invoking abandonment obscures normative questions as to where such rights should initially vest. Finally, I argue that an alternative framework where limited property rights were granted to the source of human tissue need not lead to absurd consequences, and abandonment could be useful in such a framework, as there would be expressly identified rights to abandon.
Abandonment and human bodily materials
In the celebrated case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 14 abandonment is not discussed by the court. 15 Moore, of course, had consented to have his tissue removed in the course of treatment, but not to its subsequent commercialization. He claimed unsuccessfully for conversion of property, indirectly seeking a share in the income rights of this commercialization of his excised tissue. Notwithstanding the absence of any discussion of abandonment, the Nuffield Council treated it as authority that in consenting to the operation, Moore has abandoned 'any claims over the removed tissue'. 16 This tenuous proposition is doubtful given that Moore had been misled as to the uses that were to be made of his cells, 17 and it has been contended that any recognition of abandonment would have implied that Moore has property in these cells, that is, an ownership interest to abandon, something the majority of the court was anxious to rule out.
18
No English authority was cited in the report justifying the application of abandonment to excised human tissue, and in what Matthews described as an 'exaggerated respect' paid to American judicial decisions, the US case of Venner v Thus, if the source of tissue does not positively assert what is to be done with it once it is separated from the body, it would be presumed that is abandoned in all cases. It is not difficult to conceive scenarios where this would be untrue; for example, in relation to reproductive material such as sperm where the source clearly retains an interest in what is done with the material after it has left his body. Silence as to the fate of such material would not lead automatically to the conclusion that the source was indifferent to the uses made of it in many cases. Yet, this is the presumption advocated by the Nuffield Council. There are also difficulties in utilizing the American Jurisprudence given their constitutional context, discussed below.
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Defining abandonment and distinguishing it from delivery
The term abandonment may refer to very different things: abandonment of actual or de facto possession of a thing, abandonment of ownership of the thing or abandonment of any claims in respect of the thing. 22 As we will see, although these criteria sometimes overlap, there is a tendency to treat them as interchangeable which is not correct. For instance, the abandonment of any claims in respect of a thing would probably encompass claims that arise by virtue of ownership of that thing. As Goold notes, there can be some confusion between a lay understanding of abandonment and a lawyer's: To abandon something in general, parlance is 'to give it up . . . we mean we are no longer interested in it'. 23 In addition, a non-lawyer without further thought on the matter may assume that abandoning possession of an object is always the same as abandoning ownership of it, but of course this is not always the case.
While possession is an important feature of property, it is not a necessary one, and one may lose possession of an object without losing ownership of it. 24 This is an important distinction to note when examining cases relating to the purported abandonment of human tissue. In the famous case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 25 for example, the question arose as to the rights that the plaintiff retained, if any, in his excised spleen (i.e. once he has lost possession of it). The Nuffield report suggested that he 'abandoned' any claims in respect of it by consenting to the operation to remove it. 26 However, if one examines the law relating to the transfer of ownership in chattels, the circumstances in which a loss of physical possession of an object lead to an inference that it has been abandoned are quite limited. Instead, complexity and uncertainty arise once exclusive physical control is given up. While giving up physical possession does not necessarily mean that ownership is lost, there are, according to Pollock and Wright in their famous essay and still leading work on possession, a possible 'infinite combination of facts' between having an intention to retain legal ownership in the thing and wishing to abandon all rights in it. 27 Thus, one cannot assume abandonment once control is lost unless the individual facts of the case are examined and there are many possible solutions, of which abandonment is but one. Voluntary dispossession in favour of another is delivery, while quiting possession without any specific intention of putting another in your place, according to Pollock and Wright, is abandonment. 28 This distinction is important. For delivery to take place, the relinquishing party contemplates the identity of the subsequent taker of the property; whereas, a party purporting to abandon the property is indifferent to the identity of any person who may become the subsequent owner. Thus, in abandonment, as Strahileviz notes, the relinquishing owner 'rolls the dice' as to who the subsequent owner might be. 29 With this in mind, it becomes clearer when the term abandonment is used inappropriately. I may 'abandon' my house when the mortgage becomes unsustainable, I do not likely intend putting the house 'up for grabs' in a free for all. Rather, I am abandoning it to my creditors, a situation more akin to a transfer by operation of law. 30 Delivery is possible by handing over a chattel with an intent to transfer ownership. However, such a delivery may be made, as Pollock and Wright observe, with intent to transfer:
. . . a more limited right, including the right to use or have control of that object . . . There may be cases of handing over for a limited purpose . . . It must depend on the true intent of the transaction . . . whether there is a bailment or a mere authority or licence to deal with the thing in a certain way.
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While possession is given up in all cases of delivery, it is the intent of the outgoing possessor that is the crucial element in the extent of the incoming possessors enjoyment and control. 32 As will be discussed below, many circumstances in which hospital waste comes into the possession of a medical or research institution might be more readily characterized as delivery (i.e. a voluntary transfer), and not as abandonment.
In addition to a loss of de facto possession, for legal abandonment to occur the owner must form an intention to unilaterally divest himself of ownership of the goods and any power to exclude others from exercising ownership rights over them. 33 This is called divesting abandonment. 34 The meaning of divesting abandonment is more than that implied when talking of discarding an object, the latter simply referring to a loss of possession. One may look to the taking of an abandoned thing as original acquisition or occupation.
35 This is quite a rigorous requirement, the intention to abandon all rights over a thing as well as giving up possession of it. Clearly, a person is likely to give the matter more thought if it is a part of their body (even a small part contains a person's entire genetic code) that they are discarding, as opposed to an old newspaper or used coffee cup. If one loses property without divesting intention, there is no abandonment, and this is the case even if the search for the item is abandoned. 36 It is difficult to imagine how likely it is that a distressed or unconscious patient would form such a specific intention.
As can be seen from this discussion, determining the intention of the true owner at the time that de facto possession of the res was parted with is of paramount importance in determining if abandonment has occurred. Obviously, this presents a practical difficulty in that the true owner may not be traceable, and evidence of intention will have to be garnered from the surrounding circumstances. The value and nature of the goods are relevant to the issue. It is unlikely that goods of high monetary or sentimental value were intended to be abandoned by their owner. 37 On both counts, an engagement ring is likely to have been lost; whereas a newspaper left behind at a train station is likely to have been abandoned. Where the costs of retaining ownership of an item begin to greatly outweigh the benefits, this may justify an inference that the goods were abandoned. 38 Furthermore, abandonment of de facto possession may be to enable delivery of an item by way of gift, as when items are left outside of a charity store, for example. 39 Of course, the human body has differing kinds of value: monetary, functional and sentimental, and all of these militate against a presumption of abandonment for many types of tissue. 40 One could argue that most tissue left behind by patients in a hospital is waste or garbage and could be considered abandoned by its source. Nonetheless, an examination of the case law in relation to the theft of garbage in criminal law throws up a more nuanced view. Rubbish is not usually valuable (and clearly not valuable to the person disposing of it) and abandonment can be more easily presumed for garbage than for objects of value. In treating something as rubbish and disposing of it, one shows an intention, prima facie at least, to abandon it. This is not always the case, however. R v. Edwards and Stacey 41 provides authority to the effect that an intention to permanently deprive oneself of de facto possession of an object does not constitute abandonment of ownership. The accused had been prosecuted for digging up diseased pig carcases which had been buried by their owner. The court held that the owner of the pig heads, which were a threat to public health, had retained an intention to control them by leaving them permanently in the ground. abandonment. Refuse had been placed in the dustbins for the specific purpose of being collected and taken away by the local authority and passed into the constructive possession of the local authority as soon as it was placed in their carts. 44 As there was no gap in seisin and legal possession of the goods had not been parted with, this was a case more akin to a voluntary transfer in that one is relinquishing possession to another with the intention to transfer ownership. It can hardly then be said that the owner had abandoned the rubbish to the world generally, as would have been necessary for abandonment.
The US cases: Privacy decoupled from property
As noted, the Nuffield Council relied heavily on the American case of Venner as precedent for the existence of an extremely broad presumption that tissue is abandoned once it has been separated from its source, unless the source expressly states what is to be done with it. 45 While the failure of the Nuffield Council to look for other authority has been criticized elsewhere, 46 I would note an additional problem in using this line of case law, of which Venner forms part, as authority. This is as abandonment as applied in these cases bears little resemblance to the property law concept of abandonment. This is related to the fact that these authorities concerned questions of American Constitutional law regarding the seizure of evidence and were not simply disputes as to the title to goods. In the US Constitution, the Fourth Amendment prohibits certain types of searches and seizures; however, the amendment does not protect against the seizure of abandoned property. 47 Thus, abandonment is here invoked in disputes concerning the admission of evidence in a criminal trial, a very different context from disputes concerning ownership of a chattel (or human tissue) that is supposedly abandoned. Pursuant to Katz v. United States, 48 police activity only constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if in the circumstances the defendant exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy, and if that expectation is one recognized objectively as reasonable. A seizure of a person's property occurs if there is a meaningful interference with a person's possessory interests in it. 49 The court in Katz noted that:
[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
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Thus, property abandoned by its owner does not constitute such a search or seizure and is outside of the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, the US courts have moved away from a property-based approach, that is, one where a defendant could successfully invoke Fourth Amendment protection by establishing there had been no divesting abandonment of the property in issue. 51 In a criminal context, allowing such an easy objection to the search and seizure of property would be undesirable. A defendant would merely have to assert that they had formed no intention to divest themselves of ownership of their goods, even where they had abandoned de facto physical control of them. Instead, the courts began to focus on the privacy implications of the search and seizure in determining if the Fourth Amendment applied.
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This has resulted in a somewhat muddled decoupling of the issue of abandonment from its basis in property law. Somewhat unclearly, the issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense . . . but whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search. 53 Better, perhaps, if the courts focused exclusively on the question of privacy and ignored the property aspect altogether. Nonetheless, the language of property is still utilized, often incorrectly. 54 It is not at all clear, however, what, if any, are the elements of this new doctrine of abandonment.
The most prominent case involving abandonment of bodily materials and the Fourth Amendment, and the one cited in the Nuffield report as authority for the proposition that one could abandon such materials is Venner v. State of Maryland. 55 Venner concerned whether drugs found in the excrement of an unconscious hospital patient was admissible in evidence in his subsequent trial. Admitting the evidence, the court indicated that the Fourth Amendment does not protect material that was 'once owned, possessed, or controlled by an accused, but which comes into the possession of the police after it has been abandoned or otherwise relinquished by him'. 56 It was further noted that there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy in the excrement. However, the appellant in Venner was admitted to the hospital in a semi-conscious and impaired state. The extent to which the abandonment was volitional is open to question, and the trail of hair, skin cells and so on that every person leaves behind them every day can hardly be described as volitional at all. Such loss of possession of our cells 'cannot be avoided unless one is a hermit or is fanatical in using extraordinary containment measures'. 57 Had the reasonable expectation of privacy test not been decoupled from it roots in property law, then it would have been very difficult to infer an intention to abandon in these circumstances. One could argue that the question of abandonment in these cases has been wholly subsumed in the question as to whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. In any event, it can be seen that it is wholly inappropriate to utilize this line of cases as authority for the existence of a (property law) doctrine of divesting abandonment of human bodily materials, given that it is questionable whether property law is an issue in any of these decisions at all.
The nature of 'property' in the body
Uncertainty as to the original owner of human tissue
To determine the role that the concept of abandonment plays in relation to human body parts, Goold notes, we must determine who the original owner of the material is.
58 This is not easily resolved. Much, if not all, of the conceptual confusion in this area comes from the old common law rule that there is no property in the body. 59 Notwithstanding the fact that this rule was likely based on a misreading of the early cases, it would seem too well established to do away with. 60 Thus, attempts to justify property in human biological materials are, impliedly at least, framed as exceptions to this general rule. 61 Not being a res, anything attached to the complete living body is not property and not owned. There must, in Penner's view, be some separation between the material and the person before human tissue can be property.
62 On separation from the body then, the separated material, although unowned, becomes something capable of being owned, that is, capable of being a res. This leads to the conceptualization of separated human materials as res nullius, and belonging to no one until brought under dominion. 64 In essence, the first person to exercise control over the material would be its owner. Unless this was the source of the material, ownership would fall to the first person who took possession of it. Such an approach is a logically consistent extension of the no-property rule. However, the consequences of adopting such an approach render the language of donation and the 'giftrelationship' nonsensical. How can a purported donor of property make a gift of an organ or tissue if they do not own it? As Laurie and Matthews have noted, describing such transfers in these terms implies that their source has property in their own body and its products. 65 In a similar vein, we cannot talk of a patient abandoning tissue, in the sense of a legal divesting abandonment, if they had no title to it in the first place. But what rights can the source have in the material if not property rights? 66 It has been suggested the source of the material would be estopped from seeking their return. 67 Lord Denning M.R. famously defined estoppel as being if a person:
. . . by his words or conduct, so behaves as to lead another to believe that he will not insist on his legal rights knowing or intending that the other will act on that belief -and he does so act, that again will raise an equity in favour of the other . . .
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Of course, it is implicit in this statement that the person will have legal rights that they could insist on and that they have lead another to believe they will not insist on. However, it is not at all clear what legal rights the source would be estopped from asserting in the absence of the recognition that they had some sort of property right in their own tissue.
Implicit in the categorization of excised material as res nullius is an assumption that an operating doctor removes any tissue in an independent capacity from its donor. 69 If a medical professional is engaged by me to perform a service involving excising tissue on my behalf and for my benefit, then it is a doubtful that they would immediately have a better claim to the excised tissue than me. 70 This is an important point. In the recent Australian case of Estate of the Late Mark Edwards, 71 Mr Edwards had planned to donate sperm to undergo in vitro fertilization with his wife but had died unexpectedly before the procedure. His wife sought and was granted an emergency court order to extract sperm from her husband's body. The procedure was held to apply the necessary work/skill to the material to make it property (under the exception espoused in Dodeward v. Spence) but it was held to belong to the wife and not the physician who performed the procedure 'as the samples were removed on her behalf, and for her purposes', and 'no-one else in the world had any interest in them'. 72 While legal questions concerning ownership of biomaterials usually focus on the intentions (presumed or actual) of their source, this case is illustrative of the often overlooked question as to the capacity in which the doctor is acting vis-á-vis the patient.
Additionally, Dickens imagines a scenario where a limb or digit is severed in an industrial accident. The source's interest in retrieving the severed body part and having it quickly reattached surgically 'should not be impaired by the chance of the item falling upon another's land or being retrieved and retained by a stranger not implicated in causing the loss'. 73 He advocates granting the source a prior superior right in the form of an inchoate right (which he describes as a 'right in prospect' which may become fully constituted if the material in question becomes separated from the body) so that traditional legal tests of intention, possession and control might be preserved when considering ownership. 74 Others argue that we should simply treat the body as another form of property to cut through the conceptual confusion. 75 It would be meaningful then to talk of a human source of tissue abandoning or transferring rights in it. Granting property rights, or even inchoate property rights, that are prior to the claims of any subsequent purported owner of the material solves another difficulty. As Hickey notes, a trespassing finder's rights are not affected by virtue of the trespass, and although liable for the trespass their title can only be defeated by a person showing a better (i.e. a prior, possessory) title. 76 One could interpret the Moore case in this way; the initial failure to obtain Moore's consent to the use of his tissue for research did not prevent the researchers from obtaining title to his tissue, although they were still liable for the initial lack of informed consent. If this is the law, then it incentivizes an absurd free-for-all whereby a person could wrongfully appropriate a person's tissue (in breach of their bodily integrity, for instance) and yet claim better title to it than its source and defeat any action for its return or disposal.
Conceiving of the body as property: 'Mere property' at best
Theoretically, there is no difficulty in conceiving of the body as a type of property, but a limited one. In Honoré's famous conception, possession (i.e. exclusive physical control of a thing) forms just one of the standard incidents of ownership, albeit an important one. 78 Rights of use, management, income, transfer, alienation and destruction are among those listed alongside possession. 79 According to Honoré, none of the individual incidents are necessary or sufficient for ownership. 80 Thus, the absence or loss of a right of possession is not determinative of the absence or loss of all property rights in a thing. It is easier to intuit this for real property than for chattels. Few would dispute that a landlord is the 'owner' of his property, even though he has contracted away his right to possession to his tenant for a fixed period. Thus, when one examines it closely 'ownership' is a much more complex phenomenon than would first appear. As identified by Honoré, there are many different rights that may vest in an owner, and as these rights need not vest exclusively in one person, property has many potential owners. Nevertheless, it is typical to think of property as having one owner in whom unlimited powers of control and transmission vest, what has been described as 'full-blooded ownership'. 81 It is tempting to think that all owners of property have such full-blooded ownership of it, but this is not correct. Professor Harris conceives of the 'ownership spectrum' whereby ownership is by degrees. At the upper end of the spectrum is full-blooded ownership where limits on use, control and transmission are only limited to the extent that they infringe some property independent prohibition. 82 At the lower end is what he defines as mere property which embraces use privileges as well as powers of control over the uses made by others. 83 It does not include transmissibility which is only a necessary feature of ownership in the case of money. The concept of mere property is relevant when we examine how to characterize separated body parts as property. According to a number of commentators, justificatory arguments for property do not yield full-blooded ownership vesting in the source of separated body parts, 84 but an entitlement further down the ownership spectrum more akin to mere property. Few would doubt I am free to use my body, and the control the use of it made by others (the 'bodily use freedom principle') and that this use and control is protected by laws prohibiting bodily security. Arguments for the recognition of mere property in separated body parts are an extension of this 78 principle: That which was formerly protected by laws preserving bodily integrity is now protected by vesting property in the source once the material has been separated from the body. However, because exploitative powers of transmission did not apply to the tissue before it was excised, the fact of its separation cannot have created them.
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Notwithstanding the decision in Moore (which is now over 25 years old), there is evidence that courts may find favour with such an approach. In Yearworth v. North Bristol Health Authority, 86 the court had to decide if the frozen sperm samples of the plaintiffs' constituted property, notwithstanding severe limitations on their use. The court engaged in an examination of the extent to which the men's relationship to the samples corresponded to Honoré's standard incidents of ownership, finding that the limited use rights they enjoyed were sufficient for such a finding.
Yearworth is evidence that acknowledgement that the source of the material has a prior right to it need not amount to full-blooded ownership. 87 Such an approach need not place undue costs upon hospital researchers since such a right could be abandoned, as the traditional tests of ownership -intention, possession and control -would be preserved.
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Until that is position, it is clear that invoking abandonment is meaningless: It is like placing a fig leaf on a eunuch.
Many cases of purported abandonment of human tissue more akin to delivery
There is a further conceptual difficulty in finding divesting abandonment by the source of tissue in cases involving human materials appropriated during a medical procedure: There is rarely a gap in seisin. In fact, there is a definite chain of possession starting with the source of the material, then moving to the doctor who removes it, then on to the nurses and other assistants before ending with the pathologist. 89 This can hardly be characterized as an abandonment to the world at large as there is no loss of possession at any time as would be present in a true abandonment. 90 It is more akin to a voluntary transfer, that is, a gift. Furthermore, all interest in the tissue must be abandoned simultaneously with the act of abandonment and given the forensic, diagnostic and reproductive uses which even a small sample of human tissue may be put, it is doubtful that the source of such materials, by their silence, intends to abandon all such rights over them, thereby allowing the hospital assume absolute ownership of the material to use as they please. Indeed, the source of samples will often fail to aver to the type of use that may subsequently be made of them. For instance, in Moore, the plaintiff claimed that his consent was to the removal of his spleen for therapeutic purposes, and that consent did not include subsequent commercial exploitation. 92 As McHale notes, one person's waste may be another's raw material. 93 Nonetheless, the implications of treating human tissue as abandoned are much broader than for other more usual forms of waste. For instance, the fact that every cell in the human body can reveal a person's genetic code means that an enormous quantity of information can be obtained about a person (and their family) if a DNA analysis is performed. 94 In Venner, things such as 'excrement, fluid waste, secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails' were considered abandoned on separation from the body according to the court, by force of 'human custom and experience'. 95 However, in light of developments in DNA and drug analyses technology, describing such materials as abandoned for all purposes seems inappropriate. Custom may dictate that we abandon human waste on separation from our body, but this hardly includes an authorization to perform DNA or drug analyses on it.
When parting with a tissue, a person is often unaware of its potential value. Skene draws an analogy with abandoning a piece of furniture without knowing if it had commercial potential or not. 96 This appears analogous to the principle of mistake in contract law where a mistake as to the value of an object that is not shared by another party is not legally relevant. 97 If I purchase a ring believing it to be made of gold, I cannot rescind the contract on the grounds of mistake since my mistake does not relate to the terms of the contract which are to purchase a specific ring. Caveat Emptor applies and this is not affected by the fact that the vendor knew of my mistake, or that it is clear I would not have entered into the contract had I realized it. 98 Furthermore, mistake implies a positive belief that is incorrect and failure to aver to an issue (such as the value of an object) is not sufficient for the relief to be granted. 99 Furthermore, there is a general rule in contract law that mere non-disclosure cannot constitute misrepresentation. 100 Nevertheless, abandoning furniture to a skip or giving it to a rag and bone man is very different to having tissue excised by one's attending physician during the course of medical treatment. In addition to the legal presumption of undue influence, there is also a fiduciary relationship between a doctor and patient. 101 As such, there is an exception to the general rule that non-disclosure cannot constitute misrepresentation. Even if any engagement with a patient is on behalf of a hospital or a research institute, these bodies act through the physician as their agent. 102 A physician, being a medical specialist, is clearly in a better position to assess the potential monetary value of any tissue taken than the patient themselves. 103 Let us not forget that Skene argues a mistake as to value should not affect an abandonment, that is, a divesting of goods with an intention to abandon them to the world at large. Mistake, misrepresentation and non-disclosure imply a voluntary transfer between parties who know each other, that is, not in the nature of abandonment. Incorrectly applying abandonment to transactions involving voluntary exchange serves to obscure the potential remedies that may be available to the source of material for breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty.
Furthermore, as is evident from the case law relating to abandonment and larceny, disposing of an object as trash is not conclusive of the formation of intention to abandon: One may intend to make a voluntary transfer to the binman of the rubbish for collection 104 or retain an intention to control it (in a negative sense) as being permanently disposed of. 105 
Abandonment, income rights and windfall wealth
Of course, discussions as to how we allocate property rights so as to protect the interests of their source can often omit the right to derive income from the exploitation of these materials. 106 The source of such tissue may care little what is done with it until they discover it has been commercialized. This sheds light on a problem with regard to hospital waste. It is difficult to determine if something is waste or not as its value may be contingent on the actions of others. I may be happy to allow my excised spleen be used as a teaching aid in a medical school or simply incinerated without any further thought. However, if it is to be used in research with commercial potential, this may motivate me to consider it as my property. 107 As McHale notes, what constitutes waste is relative and needs to be considered in context: 'one person's waste can be another person's raw material'. 108 An old newspaper, for instance, may have value for a recycling company or to shelter a vagrant. For ordinary chattels, there would seem to present little difficulty. If the newspaper was discarded in circumstances where one could infer an intention to abandon, the next person appropriating it would become its owner irrespective of the use they decide to make of it. If the object is valuable, however, such as a bracelet, there would be no presumption of abandonment as it would most likely have been lost.
A mistake as to the value of an abandoned object by the person abandoning it does not affect abandonment (or a voluntary transfer) once the necessary intention is formed. A similar outcome would also apply to property which has contingent value. If a company makes money selling products produced with my recycled trash, I can hardly call for a share of the profits. 109 Nonetheless, different considerations apply when it is abandonment of human biological materials in issue.
So, for example, in Moore, the plaintiff's failure to aver to the actual or contingent value of his cells would not affect his loss of ownership, nor would the subsequent use made of them by the researchers. Herein lies the rub. Such an approach implies ownership by the source that is lost or abandoned; and in the Moore case, this would have included income rights. Similar thinking is involved in the incongruous recommendation of the Nuffield Council that donated tissue be regarded as a 'gift', clearly implying the source has property rights to give, while at the same time, denying the source has such rights by invoking the 'no property in the body' rule. 110 Yet that rule is then disregarded and property in these parts will emerge 'further down the line' for valuable biotechnological products or for preserved samples that are used in teaching and research. 111 Thus, the notion of abandonment is applied in a partial and haphazard manner to vest ownership in subsequent appropriators, while denying it to the source.
Of course, it is not strictly correct to say that a person has 'no property' in their body. Intuitively, we have some rights over our bodies reflected in body-ownership rhetoric such as referring to 'my body ' . 112 Yet, it is not 'my' body, in the same way that my car is my car. If we conceive of ownership in terms of Honoré's standard incidents, these can be broadly divided into control rights and income rights. 113 A person's interest in the living body comprises the former, but not the latter, what Professor Harris conceived of as 'mere property': 'the notion that something pertaining to a person is, maybe within drastic limits, his to use as he pleases and therefore his to permit others to use gratuitously or for exchanged favours'. 114 These rights do not include the right to derive income from the thing (e.g. I may donate an organ, but not sell it). Indeed, there is academic support for the view that there can be no expressive justification for income rights given that they are conditional on external market conditions. 115 The power to donate one's body to medical research, for instance, would be regarded as an extension of the bodily use freedom principle, rather than related to any powers of transmissibility. 116 Such freedoms over the complete body are protected by a right to bodily integrity (e.g. prohibition of assault), and an argument could be made that severed parts, the recently severed finger, belong to the source, not as a chattel over which one has full-blooded ownership, but as an extension of this principle.
This reflects the reality that income rights in separated human biomaterials are not transferred by gift or abandoned by the source but are 'windfall wealth' that Harris argues should accrue to the community. 117 Windfall wealth is a new item of social wealth to which no one in the community has a better claim than anyone else. 118 Arguably, income rights in separated human biomaterials are such wealth, as they did not exist prior to such separation (their source having mere property at best in their body). Once separated, any right to their commercial exploitation is thus a windfall, as such rights did not exist prior to their separation. Thus, the source of such materials has no better claim than anybody else to the income rights in them, since these rights never vested in them, and they did not lose them. The question as to where such a windfall should land is normative and for property-specific justice reasons, according to Harris, preference is given to share such wealth with the community (or a public agency acting on its behalf). Nonetheless, one can justify conferring windfall wealth on private individuals if you do so pursuant to a simple rule that can save costs. For example, if one regards the title obtained by an adverse possessor of property as windfall wealth, ideally it should accrue to the community. This is impractical and costly, however, and conferring title on an adverse possessor is a low-cost way of providing incentives for investment in the property. 119 In Moore, the court indicated that to find for the plaintiff in conversion would allow him to recover a 'highly theoretical windfall', the implication being that to confer such a windfall on a private individual would be undesirable. 120 Yet, the California court went on to confer the windfall on a private enterprise in the form of the research institute. The possibility that the windfall ought to accrue to the community, surely a favourable option, was not even considered by the court in Moore.
Viewing income rights in such materials as windfall wealth can illuminate what is really at issue in recent notable cases. The source may contend, as happened in Moore, that the windfall should more appropriately accrue to them. Alternatively, in line with Harris's view, the source may argue that the windfall should accrue to the community. In the US case of Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital, the plaintiff donors of tissue brought an action against the defendant hospital who had been the recipient of the tissue, when the latter commenced charging licensing fees and imposed restrictions for the use of a genetic test developed in the course of the research. The plaintiffs contended that the donation had been made on the understanding that the results would be for the benefit of the general population, and that testing would be affordable and within the public domain If one accepts this argument that income rights in these materials are windfall wealth, they do not vest in the hospital or research institute by virtue of their abandonment or gift by their source. They are a new right and were not the source's to give. Use of such language in disputes as to who owns separated human tissue misleadingly implies that these are disputes where there is privity between the parties with regard to these income rights, when in fact the parties are seeking to assert ownership over a new right. Simply conferring ownership on a private hospital or research institution without a consideration of the merits of vesting them in some agency acting on behalf of the community, 'designed to swell the public coffers' as Harris says, 121 is regrettable.
Possession, policy and absurd consequences
There are conflicting policy goals that involve the issue of abandonment and human biomaterials. This conflict has been examined by contrasting the respective merits of allowing an easy or automatic presumption of abandonment versus disallowing the presumption, or severely limiting the circumstances in which it can apply. 122 Allowing abandonment be easily presumed, it is contended, provides security of ownership to a researcher once they take possession of the biomaterial. 123 It is argued that without such an easy presumption of abandonment researchers would be exposed to potential conversion claims unless they incurred the significant cost of determining ownership of each biological sample they used. 124 An elaboration of this view is the objection to property in the body because of the 'absurd consequences' that would seemingly result. For example, dropping hair in a public place could lead to a finding that you were littering, a hospital would have to ensure consent to bodily waste being disposed of, 125 and a bequest of 'all my property to my son' would not only entitle the beneficiary to the deceased's body and possessions but also the body and other tissue. 126 This approach assumes in all cases of statutory and testamentary construction, that the type of property recognized in the body would meet the definition of property in a criminal statute, or that a court would interpret a testator's devise of property to incorporate such matters as her body or excised tissue, unlikely, one would think unless expressly stated. Textbook writers consider in detail the presumption in statutory interpretation that a legislature did not intend absurd consequences to result from legislation, unless this stated in very plain language. 127 In particular, interpretations which are unworkable or impractical or 'productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief' are to be avoided. 128 A prosecution for littering in shedding hair would surely fall into this category. In Hecht v. Superior Court, 129 a case involving a purported bequest of sperm, it is easy to misstate the key issue for determination by that court as whether sperm was property or not. In fact, it was whether sperm was property for the purposes of the California Succession Statute applicable in that case, a much more limited dicta.
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Furthermore, one has control rights in the body and control rights do not necessarily lead to property. 131 The body has been described as property sui generis, 132 mere property, 133 or an 'interim' category, 134 none of which may meet the definition of property in every context, as they are more limited forms of ownership. 135 As such, the absurd consequences argument tends give in to the tendency to conflate more limited property interests with full-blooded ownership. 136 Even if a conversion claim was successful, damages in many cases contemplated by this argument (a lost hair or flake of skin) would be negligible. 137 There may be exceptions nonetheless, such as where interference with use and control rights causes significant damage to the source, such as for the unauthorized use, or loss of destruction of gametes. 138 Additionally, the absurd consequences argument assumes incorrectly that all cases of theft and conversion are treated the same by the courts. When determining the issue of possession for the resolution of a dispute, judges have some flexibility to further policy goals. This is clear from the fact that, while the issue of abandonment is found in discreet areas of law (law of wreck, criminal law, law of personal property), its application differs depending on the context. For instance, to state that 'Abandonment will not lightly be inferred' as a blanket proposition and not one restricted to cases of larceny is incorrect. Possession is not a fixed concept and possession will be found in some cases and not in others, notwithstanding factual similarities. 139 For example, the lack of a specific knowledge of the location or existence of a chattel or the absence of a particular intention with regard to it is not necessarily fatal to a finding that one has possession of it. 140 Possession, in D.R. Harris's view, is flexible and functional with a limited discretion vested in judges in marginal cases to effect policy goals with their decision. There is a list of factors that judges have regard to (namely, the physical control and knowledge and intention of the supposed owner and any rival claimant) and no single factor is determinative. 141 Thus, judges 'subconsciously' compare the facts before them with the perfect pattern of possession to see if they are sufficiently analogous to give the plaintiff the remedy sought. 142 Thus, judges have discretion to recognize possession (analogous to a finding of reasonableness) and will permit further departures from the ideal concept of possession to further justice and social policy goals. 143 The very great leeway afforded to 'owners in cases of larceny lies then in the policy of the law to convict dishonest person's when possible'. 144 One must be cautious then in generalizing that the law of abandonment in, for instance, the criminal law (where the punishment of dishonest conduct is a policy goal) will operate identically in another discreet area of law such as for conversion of human tissue, where one would assume courts would tend towards avoidance of absurd consequences.
Alternatively, it has been contended that allowing abandonment be presumed too easily would insufficiently protect the interests that the source retains in their excised tissue. 145 As noted, when an object of value, such as a wallet or gold bracelet, is found a court is likely to presume it is lost and not abandoned. 146 However, where the found item has no value or is found in circumstances that suggest it was intentionally discarded, an intention to abandon is more likely to be inferred. A res may have value in the market, that is, an objective economic value, or subjective value, that is, objects that may not have a market value but hold personal significance for the individual and is associated with their personhood. 147 Separated human biomaterials can hold both types of value. In the former category, there are a number of cases involving disputes over the source's entitlement to income rights in the products of medical research made from their biomaterials. 148 In the second category, there are products that have personal significance for the source, usually associated with reproduction such as sperm, ova and embryos. 149 This value can be functional as well. In Dickens' example, a recently severed finger would clearly still have value to its source, since it could be reattached. As long as that is the case, it would seem unwise to infer abandonment. 150 Herein lies the major difficulty in determining such disputes through a discussion of the concept of abandonment: It is a blunt instrument that distracts from normative questions that are often a more appropriate grounds for determining ownership. At law, legal abandonment entails the abandonment of all rights in a res. But, given the personal nature of the body, this seems like overkill. If I have lost de facto physical control over a blood sample which contains information pertaining to my health and my entire genetic code, or of a sperm sample which contains such genetic information in readily utilizable form, it seems inappropriate to conclude that I have abandoned all of my interests in the sample in question in the absence of explicit evidence that this was my intention. In terms of protecting patient interests, the value of a property model is that it allows continuing control over the separated materials. 151 Nonetheless, the casualness with which abandonment has been invoked by some commentators would tend to lend support to adopting a consent, as opposed to a property, model when dealing with such materials, although there are nuanced arguments for both. 152 Consent, of course, requires explicit authorization of the type of use that is to be made of the material. Perhaps, a hybrid approach would be preferable.
For instance, Laurie appears to suggest that some sort of inalienable property right could be recognized to protect the dignity and integrity of the human person and draws an analogy with the protection afforded in intellectual property law to artist's moral rights. 153 This leads into another question obscured when such disputes are framed in the language of abandonment. Arguably, the question is often not whether I have abandoned the material, but whether certain human biological products ought to be the objects of property at all. 154 Treating such material as a res that may be abandoned like any other res ignores the question as to whether, in the circumstances, there is sufficient conceptual separation from the person who is the source of the material so that the material can appropriately be considered an object of property. 155 Rights that pertain to the so-called 'indivisible person' might be better protected under the law of privacy or by property independent prohibitions. 156 Furthermore, the finality implied by abandonment would seem to offer lower protection to the source than adopting a consent model where specific uses of the material need to be expressly assented to, even sometime after separation from the person has taken place.
Conclusion
There is a myriad of objections to invoking the concept of abandonment to separated human biological materials. Much of the difficulty comes from utilizing a property law concept, despite the failure (for the most part) of the law to recognize that the source of these materials has any property rights in them. Such materials are the source's property in so far as their actions can be taken to have extinguished any ownership rights they had in them before being acquired by a hospital or research institute. However, when one inquires as to the ownership rights that the source abandoned, one is met with the objection that there is no property in the body. You can't have your cake and eat it. While there is a failure to recognize the property rights of the source in the body, then it is the language of property that should be abandoned.
There is also merit in recognizing a limited form of property in separated body partsmere property -that is an extension of the bodily use freedom principle. Absurd consequences need not result as such items would not be the same as chattels and would not be treated the same. Such an approach need not impose onerous costs on medical institutions in investigating ownership. Furthermore, most cases of purported abandonment in a medical context are more akin to a voluntary transfer, as there is no roll of the dice as to the identity of the next owner. The misdescription of such transfers as abandonment obscures questions about the agency and undue influence that are appropriately raised where a fiduciary personally benefits through the relationship from a gratuitous transfer of a valuable or useful res. Finally, it is more appropriate to determine entitlement to income rights in such materials by reference to nuanced normative questions concerning where ownership of windfall wealth should vest, not by reference to the blunt instrument of abandonment.
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